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Article 1

ESSAY

The Roles of a Federal District Court
Judge
Jack B. Weinstein†
These views orient new law clerks to some of my
principles and practices.1 They may also be useful to those who
appear before me.
I.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Courts provide a public service paid for mainly through
taxes. Under Article III of the United States Constitution, the
federal nisi prius judge’s primary responsibility is to end
disputes that can be decided using legal criteria, within the
trial court’s jurisdiction as set by Congress and the
Constitution, through litigation commenced by a person with
standing. A trial judge is, for most people, the human face of
the law. He or she deals with people in the courtroom.
Our court is as inviting and welcoming as possible to
every litigant, witness, juror, observer, and lawyer before it.
Judge, staff, and court personnel treat every person with
dignity, listening respectfully and being as helpful as possible.
Everyone who wishes to be heard—whether as a party, an
amicus, stakeholder, victim, or someone indirectly affected—
receives a hearing on the record.

†

Senior United States District Court Judge, Eastern District of New York.
See generally Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government Of,
By, and For The People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1 (2008) (providing further elucidation of author’s views on the judicial system). A
thirty-seven page document marked “Orientation for Incoming Clerks” contains details
and personal information for my clerks’ eyes only; it is updated each year. See also FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., LAW CLERK HANDBOOK (Sylvan A. Sobel ed., 2d ed. 2007), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/LawClHbk.pdf/$file/LawClHbk.pdf.
1
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The judge and a magistrate judge are assigned to each
case at the outset by random selection. Related criminal and
civil cases may be transferred to one judge to achieve more
effective administration. Assignment by type of case is not
desirable because it ignores the Article III judge’s strength as a
generalist in the law. Fixed routines are useful for handling
discovery and dividing responsibility for preparation of the case
between the judge and magistrate judge. When a case is
assigned to me, I review the complaint and mark it for
“routine” or “special” treatment, including expedited control by
the magistrate judge. Electronic filing aids the judge in closely
monitoring each case.
Oral and written decisions and orders are more likely to
be accepted as fair if they are handed down with reasons that
can be understood by laymen as well as lawyers. These
explanations may also serve to educate the public about its
legal responsibilities. A short oral ruling from the bench, or a
slightly more detailed opinion made available on electronic
research services, is often more valuable to the parties than a
delayed, polished decision designed for print. The judge’s
obligation to educate can also be satisfied—to the extent
personal and family obligations permit—by lectures to lay and
professional
groups,
teaching,
and
participation
in
philanthropic activities.
All parties before the court are treated equally. Because
of differences among litigants in their understanding of the
legal process and in their economic situation, all practicable
steps are taken to keep the litigation field level. Appropriate
action includes appointment of pro bono counsel; shifting of
costs where authorized; limitation on fees; help in filing papers
and responding to motions; explanation of the court’s
requirements and decisions; payment of counsel and expenses
under the Criminal Justice Act;2 and help from the pro se staff
of the clerk’s office.3
Sympathy for the poor or well-to-do must not affect
substantive results. But empathy is not forbidden: it allows the
court to better understand the positions of the parties. In some
instances, as in civil rights and criminal cases, the Constitution
or a statute compels positive steps to ensure that the court is
2

18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1) (2006).
See, e.g., Tracy v. Freshwater, No. 08-1769, 2010 WL 4008747, at *10 (2d Cir.
Oct. 14, 2010) (“The solicitude afforded to pro se litigants takes a variety of forms. It most
often consists of liberal construction of pleadings, motion papers, and appellate briefs.”).
3
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equally available to all—procedurally and substantively. These
policies are enforced by legal fees in civil rights cases.
II.

LITIGATION

A.

Speed and Efficiency

Speed in adjudication and reduction in transactional
costs are essential. But time required to gather evidence, to
permit factual clarification, or to encourage settlement may
justify a reasonable delay, which will be afforded. Every effort
is made by the court, acting with or without a jury, to get the
facts as accurate as possible, given the limitations of the
Constitution on admissibility, time, and cost constraints;
appropriate efficiency; and the need to reduce prejudice.4
B.

Attorneys

The court attempts to obtain the assistance it requires
to reach a sound result on the merits. Its main resource is the
attorneys in the case, who are expected to fully brief and argue
any issues on which the judge requires advice, and to be fully
prepared for arguments on such matters as motions, proposed
charges, and rulings on prospective evidentiary problems. In
advance of argument, it is appropriate and often beneficial for
the judge to formally order counsel to brief and discuss specific
difficulties. This practice is particularly beneficial where an
intricate legal or factual issue must be decided.
Oral argument is useful in avoiding hasty, improper
conclusions, and in arriving at a fuller understanding of the
case; it is encouraged. For somewhat the same reason, motions
for summary judgment, as compared to those directed at the
pleadings, are preferred, since, after even limited discovery, the
case’s potential can be more adequately appreciated. Successive
4

See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (The Rules are to be “construed and
administered to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 50 (titled “Prompt Disposition”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52
(titled “Harmless and Plain Error”); FED. R. EVID. 102 (mandating that the Rules be
“construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense
and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end
that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined”); FED. R. EVID.
403 (Relevant “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.”).
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waves of amended pleadings and motions directed at the
pleadings are often useless in obtaining an appropriate decision
on the merits.
C.

The Court and Law Clerks

Elbow law clerks are invaluable. Their presence, youth,
learning, and integrity are one of the many benefits of serving
on the federal bench. Since most federal judges’ law clerks (and
student externs) serve for only a short period, and the position
constitutes a valuable post-graduate internship, it is helpful for
the judges to discuss with them in detail the nuances of the
cases and courtroom proceedings. This practice will help clarify
the judge’s thinking and elicit more useful contributions from
the clerks. They are subject to the same ethical restraints as
the judge, and, accordingly, they should not reveal chambers’
discussions before or after the decision.
Law clerks are expected to disagree with the judge and
to suggest improvements if they believe errors are being made.
Ours is a joint effort to produce the best result we can.
The court will seek additional temporary law clerk
personnel and the assistance of other judges where a
particularly complex case requires it; the priority is sound
results, not pride. Magistrate judges, special masters, experts,
and the like can be helpful in expanding the judge’s resources.
Cooperation between state and federal judges in
adjudicating related cases is desirable. Where complex cases
arising from the same event are pending in both federal and
state courts—as in asbestos, securities, or pharmaceuticals
litigation—it is useful for the trial judges of both systems to
work together to reduce costs, speed decisions, and agree on a
uniform approach to applicable law, appointment of special
masters, discovery, damages, scheduling of trials, and the like.
Collaboration with other federal judges is strongly encouraged.
Research by the court itself on background facts and law
is often necessary. The court should make the parties aware of
its independent investigations—and the sources utilized in any
such investigation—so that the parties can correct
misconceptions. Limitations on formal judicial notice in the
Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to this research.
Discussing pending cases informally over morning coffee
with magistrate judges and other judges is helpful. Law clerks
may not, however, discuss matters sub judice with anyone
outside of chambers.
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In difficult sentencing matters, a formal panel of judges
is useful. Such discussions are helpful in gaining a broader and
more diverse perspective when making sentencing decisions.
All of the relevant sentencing papers are made available to
each participating judge to ensure an informed interchange.
The chief judge may wish to select the panel and sit in on the
deliberation. Ultimately, though, it is for the sentencing judge
to decide this most serious of matters after a full sentencing
hearing, with experts and witnesses as needed.
The class action, and other devices such as consolidation
of related cases, are often useful and appropriate for
aggregating and administering mass cases, but they require
close supervision by the judge.5 Reduction of transactional costs
and fairness to all must be stressed in complex litigations.
Particularly in cases where there is little or no personal
relationship between plaintiffs’ counsel and many clients—the
usual situation in mass cases—the court has an obligation to
insist that clients are kept informed, that their wishes are
given appropriate weight, and that limits on fees take account
of the reduced per capita costs of representation.
The Internet has great promise as a means of improving
the ability of individual litigants in mass cases to receive
information, view and participate in proceedings, and
communicate with their attorneys, each other, and the court.
Experiments with blogs and social media technologies—e.g.,
Facebook and Twitter—to disseminate case information and
improve communications are encouraged. Online videos can
provide information and instruction to litigants, attorneys, and
others in a readily digestible and accessible format. In using
these technologies, however, the court should consider privacy
issues6 and make an effort to minimize interference with
control of the case by a cacophony of voices.
At the very least, the court can facilitate easy access to
case files for litigants through the federal courts’ Electronic
Case Filing system. Restricted televising of live court

5

See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION
(2010); KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?: THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO
COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 (PublicAffairs 2005); JAY TIDMARCH & ROGER H.
TRANSGRUD, MODERN COMPLEX LITIGATION (2d ed. 2010); JACK B. WEINSTEIN,
INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION (Nw. Univ. Press 1995).
6
See Reena Raggi, Opening Remarks at the Philip D. Reed Lecture Series:
Conference on Privacy and Internet Access to Court Files, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2010).
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proceedings can be another helpful way for the court to
disseminate information.7
While ours is an adversarial system that relies upon the
lawyers to shape a lawsuit, the judge should, when necessary,
exercise an active role in controlling and guiding the case. It is
appropriate for the judge to help in settlement of civil cases.8
When approved by counsel, off-the-record settlement
discussions by the parties, alone or together, are encouraged.
In a few sensitive cases, the court will have a court reporter
present, sealing the record.
Special settlement masters, chosen by the parties from a
short list approved by the court, are particularly useful in any
complicated civil matter involving potentially large judgments
and many claimants. Organizing the attorneys so that one of
them or a committee can speak for all the lawyers enhances both
settlement and efficient administration of a mass litigation.
In a nonjury case, the court does not discuss settlement,
but the magistrate judge who is not trying the case may do so.
The judge must not try to settle a criminal case.9
D.

The Jury

The petit jury is a key element in federal practice. It is
often constitutionally required, unless waived. Even in those
cases where a bench trial is called for, an advisory jury may
serve the court and parties by bringing to bear the wisdom of a
7

See Judiciary Approves Pilot Project for Cameras in District Courts, THE
THIRD BRANCH (Sept. 2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/10-09-01/
Judiciary_Approves_Pilot_Project_for_Cameras_in_District_Courts.aspx (“The judicial
conference . . . approved a pilot project to evaluate the effect of cameras in federal
district courtrooms and the public release of digital video recordings of some civil
proceedings. . . . Courts that participate in the pilot will, if necessary, amend their local
rules (providing adequate public notice and opportunity to comment) to provide an
exception for judges participating in the pilot project. Participation will be at the trial
judge’s discretion.”); see also In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 1657
(E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2010), available at http://vioxx.laed.uscourts.gov/Orders/o&r101910.pdf
(order granting in part counsel fees and reimbursement of expenses) (“Furthermore, to
give transparency to this litigation, the Court created a web site accessible to all
counsel and the public at large. All motions, Court orders, opinions, recent
developments, a calendar of scheduled events, and various other matters were posted
on this web site. Throughout the litigation monthly status conferences were held in
open court. Notice of the meetings were posted on the web site and were open to all.
Transcripts of these conferences were posted on the Court’s web site for those who
could not attend.” (footnote omitted)).
8
See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5) (stating that facilitating settlement is one
purpose of pretrial conferences with the judge).
9
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (The court “must not participate” in plea
discussions.).
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cross-section of the community. While witnesses and others can
provide the judge with a window into our fascinating modern
world, the jury, steeped in the details of daily life, often has a
better feel for what is appropriate with respect to, for example,
what constitutes invidious discrimination in the workplace.
The judge is largely isolated from the life of the multitudes by
age, class, and training. Even if he or she would have reached
the same result as a jury, the jurors’ verdict sometimes
satisfies the public and litigants of impartiality and lack of
influence. The participation of jurors also reduces some of the
emotional and intellectual burdens on the judge.
A jury is chosen in a process that eliminates, so far as
possible, those who will not be fair. Primary responsibility for
winnowing out those who should not serve in a particular case
is the judge’s, with assistance from the attorneys suggesting
questions and exercising peremptory challenges. In high-profile
or complex cases, detailed written questionnaires are useful; an
explicit waiver for the use of this technique should be obtained
from the parties to avoid a contention that the public was
excluded from the voir dire.
Jurors must be treated with great respect and common
sense by being supplied with the following: pen and paper to
take notes in the courtroom; the right (seldom utilized) to
question witnesses through a writing presented to the judge;
explanations of courtroom proceedings; clearly written
instructions on the law; precisely and simply phrased verdict
sheets; lists of witnesses and exhibits; and, when called for
during deliberations, the evidence and such aids as calculators.
Testimony requested by a deliberating jury can be read in court
or sent into the jury room in redacted form (now available
almost instantaneously from the court reporter). In the future,
video recordings should be available in some cases.
Out of concern for jurors’ time, trials should proceed in
full workdays without delays for sidebars, which can be
eliminated by requiring briefing and argument of all in limine
matters each day before the jury arrives. Recesses should be
frequent, but short. The court provides lunch and refreshments
paid for by the government and brought to the jury room to
reduce eating-time delays. A spacious, well-lit jury room and
adequate toilet facilities are available. Current magazines and
books, as well as colorful pictures on the walls, make for a
pleasant working environment.
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The Courtroom

Nothing in court should be off-the-record. Trial judges
owe an obligation to preserve the public character both of
disputes before them and of the resolution of those disputes. Use
of a good loudspeaker system allows everyone in the courtroom
to know what is happening. Every aspect of the case should be
available for public observation and review unless a narrowly
tailored exception—explicitly justified and usually agreed to by
the parties—outweighs the policy favoring open proceedings.
It is important that the visage of the witness be visible
to the judge as well as to the jury. The distance and sight lines
from the witness to the jury box and judge in our federal
courtrooms are poorly designed; it is difficult for the jury and
judge to see the witness’s demeanor and body language. The
situation can be improved by rearranging courtroom furniture.
Conferences and motions conducted around a table in open
court by judge and counsel permit calm, businesslike, and
rational discussions, discouraging posturing and contentiousness.
Consultation between an incarcerated petitioner—appearing from
prison by telephone or video connection—and his counsel can be
accomplished by clearing the courtroom.
Neither robe nor gavel is required. Everyone in the
courtroom knows who the judge is and needs no reminder of
the court’s authority. Since I, when a jury is not present, sit at
a table with litigants and counsel—and when a jury is present
will, from time to time, sit in or near the jury box to observe
what the jury is seeing—robe and gavel are incongruous.
F.

Criminal Sentencing

At sentencing, the defendant will be apprehensive, but
can be calmed by the presence of relatives or a friend alongside;
they can answer the court’s questions about the defendant and
better help the accused address his problems. It is useful to
have the judge at the table facing the defendant to encourage
more relaxed communication among those present. While
“therapeutic jurisprudence” has not been recognized as an
aspect of the judge’s duty, many cases require giving directions
to the probation department and defendant with respect to
details of jobs, family, relationships, drug and psychiatric
treatment, education, and the like.
Since so many defendants and their families have
serious financial, mental, and other problems, the judge must
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consider utilizing the presentence and probation departments,
as well as outside available social agencies. Providing legal aid
and social work agencies in both civil and criminal matters is
desirable. Our court has a foundation that pays for private
social services when government money is not available.
Nonincarceratory sentences and early termination of
supervised release or probation, where warranted, need more
serious consideration. This is particularly true in a district
such as ours, where large proportions of young males in some
communities are cut off by long incarceration far away from
their loved ones, who cannot afford to travel.
Our criminal justice system remains the harshest in the
Western world.10 We must constantly ask ourselves, “Is this
sentence unnecessarily cruel?”11
Sentencing hearings are videotaped for purposes of
appeal unless a party objects. The appellate court may better
understand why the trial court found the sentence reasonable
if it “sees” the proceeding and also reads the stenographic
record and documents. Body language of participants and
observers is often significant.

10

See, e.g., Glenn C. Loury & Bruce Western, The Challenge of Mass
Incarceration in America, DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 5, 6 (“With roughly 5 percent of
the world’s population, the United States currently confines about 25 percent of the
world’s prison inmates. The American prison system has grown into a leviathan
unmatched in human history. . . . The financial costs entailed are staggering, and the
extent of human suffering endured boggles the mind.”); see also Aya Gruber, A
Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 73 (2010) (discussing
retributivism and utilitarianism as justifications for criminal punishment and
criticizing victimization as a basis for increasing sentence harshness, stating that
“[a]lthough touting victim-centered reforms serves prosecutors’ and policymakers’
interests, it is another question altogether whether such reforms actually improve
victims’ lives”).
11
See, e.g., Cecelia Klingele, Michael S. Scott & Walter J. Dickey,
Reimagining Criminal Justice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 953, 984 (“[A] trial judge can begin
inside the courtroom, ensuring that any sentence she imposes ‘does no harm’—that is,
that the sentence itself is a plausible response to the crime that has been committed,
the offender who committed it, and the context in which the crime took place. When
judges understand the larger social context within which a crime has occurred, they
will be able to more accurately assess the deterrent or rehabilitative value of any
sentence imposed and to adjust their dispositions accordingly. Of course, in order to
impose such sentences, judges need contextual, problem-oriented information about
crime and about the full range of sentencing options available—both in the community
and in the jail or prison system. When counsel fail to provide such information, judges
should not hesitate to request it.”).
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involves

interpreting,

applying,

and

Procedural and Substantive Law

When deciding procedural matters, the court has
considerable discretion in construing the rules. Aside from
some statutory requirements and constitutional standards,
such as those for jury trials, all federal courts are given
procedural rule-making authority, with considerable flexibility
in application. This does not include power to directly affect
substantive law.
Nevertheless, the substantive balance between
parties—what benefits they can expect from litigation—may be
affected by applicable procedure, making it easier or harder to
prosecute or defend, or to delay or expedite, an action. In
modifying procedure, the court considers how it may be
affecting the practical rights of the parties and justifies in
writing any changes made. Our advisory committee of lawyers
practicing before the court is helpful in commenting on, and
recommending changes to, local practice and rules.
B.

Diversity Jurisdiction

Federalism’s exotica supplies some of the pleasurable
intellectual stimulation that goes with the judge’s job. Under the
rule of Erie,12 state substantive law governs in diversity cases. A
12

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Increasingly there are
“intersystemic adjudication” issues requiring federal courts to rely on state criminal
law and vice versa. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Erie and Federal Criminal Courts, 63
VAND. L. REV. 1243 (2010). For an example of the importance of characterizing the
issue as substantive or procedural for Erie and other purposes, see Shady Grove
Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (applying federal rules to
allow the class action rather than state law, which is less permissive of class actions).
But see In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 2d 397, 463 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
(contra Shady Grove); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Max Heuer, Class Certification:
Developments Over the Last Five Years 2005-2010, CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA)
NO. 11, at S-3 (2010) (expressing uncertainty about the impact of Shady Grove). The
mix is enriched by issues of preemption, raising the question of applicability of federal
or state tort law (see, e.g., Julie A. Steinberg, Justices Voice Concern over Immunity,
Address Legislative Intent in Vaccine Act Case, 38 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA)
1064 (2010)); federal due process limits on state tort and punitive damages (see, e.g.,
Scalia Stays $241 Million Tobacco Judgment; Reliance Issue Raises Due Process
Concerns, 38 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 1018 (2010)); and status of controlling
federal or state law in removals (see, e.g., Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct. 1262
(2009); Fed. Treasury Enter. Sojuzplodoimport v. Spirits Int’l N.V., No. 06-CV-3532,
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federal court’s power to modify state substantive law to meet
new problems is, as a matter of comity, more limited than that of
the state’s judges. But rulings on relevant state law cannot be
avoided by district judges; we do not have the power to certify
questions of state law to the highest state court—a process often
available to the circuits’ courts of appeals.13 The federal trial
court cannot evade decision using the excuse that applicable
state law is unclear, thereby foregoing statutory and
constitutional duties to adjudicate the case or controversy before
it. The nisi prius federal court is, as a practical matter,
restricted to taking small steps in modifying state law.
C.

Federal Question Jurisdiction

In the absence of a precedential, statutory, or
constitutional limitation, federal trial judges necessarily have
the same constitutional and statutory power to construe federal
substantive law as any other Article III judge.14 Almost all
constitutional and other legal issues funneled up to the
Supreme Court will have been first passed on by a federal
district court.
In ruling on an issue subject to precedent or statutory
interpretation, the trial court must apply the same
interpretative devices used by appellate courts—textual
meaning, design in context, and grammatical parsing, among
others. Some flexibility is afforded by limited application of
doctrines such as lenity or absurdity. A restrained approach to
lawmaking by the nisi prius judge is warranted. Sudden
changes in law may unfairly impact those who have acted on
reasonable evaluations of what the courts are likely to do. An
effort should be made to avoid frustrating those expectations
except in unusual situations. When we depart, or extrapolate,
2010 WL 3928910, at *5 (2d Cir. Oct. 8, 2010) (“[I]f federal courts could not determine
the state-law issues intertwined with a copyright suit, then the plaintiff would be
forced to litigate exclusively in state court and would be deprived of the remedies
Congress provided in the Copyright Act.”)).
13
See, e.g., Baker v. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 264 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“Where an unsettled and significant question of state law . . . will control the outcome
of [the] case, we may certify that question to the New York Court of Appeals.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
14
For a statute requiring the Supreme Court to find applicable law, which
must not be changed by lower courts, thereby, perhaps, implicitly recognizing a federal
trial judge’s power to construe federal law in other contexts, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)
(2006) (“unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States” required for some habeas corpus grants
(emphasis added)).
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from precedent, there is a special need to justify the rule
change in a coherent and comprehensive publishable opinion.
Substantive due process, to an even greater extent than
other areas of law, requires relative stability. As Justice Holmes
reminds us, the law is a prediction of what courts will do.15
Appellate courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, can take
longer steps in providing “new” substantive law, in part because
they provide the broader geographic uniformity required for a
national rule, and in part because of hierarchical considerations.
Conflicts between the United States Constitution and
statutes or precedent must be resolved in favor of our basic
legal document. Interpretations of the Constitution by courts
below the Supreme Court present conceptual and practical
difficulties. On critical issues the Supreme Court is often
divided. It is hard to predict what approach will govern in any
particular dispute—whether, for example, the majority will
rely on a restrictive textual and historical approach (like that
sometimes used by Justice Scalia), or on an approach with
more flexibility in meeting sociological, technological, political,
and economic changes (like that sometimes used by Justice
Breyer).16 It is also difficult to predict how much the Court will
be affected by its evaluation of what appear to be major
changes in the public’s view of such matters as gender or racial
discrimination, abortion, or homosexuality.
When it comes to interpreting the Constitution, trial
judges’ decisions, perhaps even more than those of other judges,
tend to be affected by changes in the country’s fundamental
circumstances. They observe today’s life in the courtroom and
elsewhere. All judges recognize the central need to protect
against the possible tyranny of the majority by enforcing the
fundamental protections built into the Constitution. In doing so,
judges reduce inequalities of opportunity among our people so
far as is practicable in a free society.17
In grey areas, trial judges’ individual backgrounds,
experience, and legal training will count. While these differences
require each judge to follow his or her own legal analysis, a trial
court decision can be overruled by the court of appeals or the
15

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
For an analysis of the variety of approaches to statutory and constitutional
interpretation used selectively by the Supreme Court, see, for example, STEPHEN
BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 75-156 (2010).
17
See Samuel Freeman, A New Theory of Justice, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 14,
2010, at 58.
16
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Supreme Court, mitigating the potential harm of a deviant nisi
prius opinion to the symmetry of our rich legal fabric.
Accordingly, the trial judge is freed of some inhibitions against
making what appear to be necessary changes in the law.
It is natural, on the one hand, for a nisi prius judge to
be disappointed when the court of appeals or Supreme Court
comes to a different conclusion from that reached by the
district court. But, on the other hand, there is some comfort in
knowing that at least three serious judges will be available to
correct errors and injustices. In short, the nisi prius judge
should do the best job she or he is capable of, and then try to
forget about the case.
Where the law seems due for a modification, it is
desirable to provide a comprehensive evidentiary hearing and
rulings on the facts. To ensure that an important issue is
thoroughly considered, the trial court may find it useful, as
already noted, to issue a preliminary order informing the
lawyers of the nature of the proceeding it envisages, with
specific questions of law and fact and the kinds of experts and
other witnesses it requires. In some instances, the court may
issue a judgment with a “preliminary” opinion, subject to further
expansion and development; this device can speed appeals.
A direct precedent on point is binding unless clearly
undermined or eroded.18 The trial judge’s prediction of what the
appellate court’s views will be is an important consideration in
any decision, but it is fraught with the usual difficulties in
understanding any Delphic Oracle.
While the trial court is obliged to follow a ruling
decision, its position observing people and situations may, as
already suggested, provide a useful understanding of
developing problems and the need for change. The trial judge
physically observes the people who are affected by the law and
may sense their problems through direct interactions, rather
than through the indirect medium of the record or abstract
analysis. This was true, for example, of federal trial judges’
general view that Sentencing Commission guidelines were
often unnecessarily harsh; this consensus probably had an
impact on appellate liberalizing of the sentencing process. It is
the responsibility of a trial judge to highlight where and how

18

See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (cancelling sixty years
of increasingly shaky precedent).
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the law is going astray and to suggest that the appellate court,
legislature, or other law-making authority revisit the issue.
The characterization of the matter as governed by
federal substance or procedure raises intellectually challenging
issues. In construing state statutes, the methods of
interpretation used by the state courts rather than those used
by federal courts should be employed. For example, the New
York Court of Appeals appears to some to be utilizing a “resultoriented” method in domestic relations cases.19 In federal
practice, there is some lack of consistency. Different courts
recognize disparate approaches as valid, ranging from a “strict
constructionist” technique, based almost wholly on the
supposed meaning of the language of the statute or
constitutional provision at the time of drafting, to a modified
textual form, which relies in part on legislative history20 and on
changing meanings and current needs. The famous statement
of Judge Cardozo is particularly appealing: “Our concern is to
define the meaning [of a term] for the purpose of a particular
statute which must be read in the light of the mischief to be
corrected and the end to be attained.”21
Complexities of the American legal system and a lack
of consensus on statutory interpretation rules—although in
some states the legislature is attempting to impose
interpretation principles by statute22—make for a fascinating
series of problems for federal judges and law clerks.
As partners in the administration of government, judges
are mindful of the ancient philosophical and religious questions
underlying their work: what is the good life and the good
19

See Timothy M. Tippins, Decisions Continue Pattern of Result-Oriented
Jurisprudence, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 2010, at S8 (citing numerous cases for the
proposition that the New York Court of Appeals has an “outcome orientation” when
deciding domestic relations cases).
20
See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750,
1829-42 (2010).
21
Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 158 (1934); see also Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.
Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009) (“The chorus that has called for us to revisit Belton includes
courts, scholars, and Members of this Court who have questioned that decision’s clarity
and its fidelity to Fourth Amendment principles. We therefore granted the State’s
petition for certiorari.”); id. at 1722 (“The doctrine of stare decisis is of course essential
to the respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law,
but it does not compel us to follow a past decision when its rationale no longer
withstands careful analysis.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); cf. Abbot v.
United States, Nos. 09-479, 09-7073, 2010 WL 4569898 (U.S. Nov. 15, 2010) (relying on
congressional intent to interpret “except” clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
22
See Gluck, supra note 20, at 1785-1803.
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society; what are the utilitarian, consequential choices; and
what are applicable moral, deontological rules such as those
embodied in our Declaration of Independence and Constitution.
Do the latter support rules for individual autonomy, fair
procedures, and equitable division of the country’s
23
opportunities and wealth? Federal judges are fortunate to
have available post-graduate seminars and conferences on
history, philosophy, science, and economics that keep their
minds open to the details as well as the purposes of the law.
There should be no inhibition on using foreign state and
international law as authority, either as a model, or, as is more
often occurring, as dispositive authority on a substantive law
issue.24 Rejecting this rich source of knowledge is a form of
xenophobia unworthy of our creative American legal system.
Care must be taken by seeking assistance from the lawyers and
their experts before incorporating this information into a
decision. There is danger in transplanting foreign norms and
principles into a subtly different American context, given its
uniquely diverse population and distinctive legal tradition.
Much of the same sense of humility is required before we rely
on scientific or other special fields of knowledge.25
IV.

CONCLUSION

We reenact each day in the courthouse the ancient
struggle to impose both justice and its antagonist, mercy. The
trial court is always concerned with the conflict between strict
law and flexible equity. Analytical purity in chambers favors
the former; empathy in the courtroom for individuals living in
an imperfect world leans toward the latter.
A candid statement of the reasoning supporting the trial
court’s decision is always required. Mendacity in twisting the
23

See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 17.
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (noting a decision of
the European Court on Human Rights and its authority in all countries that are members
of the Council of Europe in determining the legal status of consensual sodomy); Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind: The Value of a
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, Address Before the Constitutional
Court of South Africa (Feb. 7, 2006), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/public
info/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_02-07b-06.html (discussing the value of
“comparative dialogue” when interpreting the Constitution); Justice Stephen G. Breyer,
Making the Constitution Work: A Supreme Court Justice’s View, Address at the
American Law Institute 87th Annual Meeting (May 17, 2010) (discussing the difficulty
and necessity of understanding the laws of other nations).
25
See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng, Scientific Evidence as Foreign Law, 75 BROOK.
L. REV. 1095 (2010).
24
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facts, evidence, history, or legal background to arrive at a
conclusion is not acceptable. As Learned Hand put the matter,
describing the practice of Justice Cardozo, “[h]e never disguised
the difficulties, as lazy judges do who win the game by
sweeping all the chessmen off the table . . . .”26
Ultimately, it is the trial judge’s conscience, exercised
under the constraints of our rule of law, that guides the pen
writing an opinion justifying a judgment. We lack the capacity
to adequately satisfy our position’s daunting demands. But we
must keep trying to rise to the occasion.

26

Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 52 HARV. L. REV. 361, 362 (1939); see
also id. at 361 (“[A judge] must preserve his authority by cloaking himself in the majesty
of an overshadowing past; but he must discover some composition with the dominant
trends of his time—at all hazards he must maintain that tolerable continuity without
which society dissolves, and men must begin again the weary path up from savagery.”).

